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COMMENT

BILY v. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.: AN UNNECESSARY
RETURN TO PRIVITY IN CASES OF AUDITOR
NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION

In the past fifteen years, accountants have been defendants in
more negligence actions than in the previous history of the profession,' and the dollar amounts of judgments in such actions have increased dramatically. In August of 1992, Price Waterhouse, one of
the "Big Six"8 accounting firms, was found liable for $338 million to
the purchaser of a bank as a result of a negligent audit the firm had
performed for the bank.4 On November 24, 1992, it was reported
that Ernst & Young, another firm in the "Big Six," paid the government of the United States $400 million to settle potential claims for
1. See Robert Mednick, Accountant's Liability: Coping With the Stampede to the
Courtroom, J. AcCT., Sept. 1987, at 118, 119.
2. Nancy Chaffee, Note, The Role and Responsibility of Accountants in Today's Society, 13 J. CORP. L. 863, 863-64 & n.2 (1988). For example, while the Big Eight firms were
held liable for a total of $177 million in 75 cases or settlements between 1979 and 1984, in
1986, merely three judgments cost these firms $195 million. Id. n.2. The dollar amounts of
judgments and settlements in a single case of auditor negligence can now run into the $300$400 million range. See, e.g., infra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
3. In 1988, the business of conducting audits of large publicly held companies was dominated by eight large international firms known as the "Big Eight." These CPA firms were:
Arthur Andersen Co.; Arthur Young & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand; Deloitte, Haskins & Sells;
Ernst & Whitney; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price Waterhouse & Co.; and Touche Ross
Co. Samuel S. Paschall, Liability To Non-Clients: The Accountants' Role and Responsibility,
53 Mo. L. REV. 693, 694 n.3 (1988). The "Big Eight" have become the "Big Six" through
mergers: Ernst & Young, and Deloitte & Touche are the two new merged firms. Alison L.
Cowan, Changes in Accounting Leave Big Firms Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at D2.
4. Lee Berton & Stephen J. Adler, CPA's Nightmare: How Audit of a Bank Cost Price
Waterhouse $338 Million Judgment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1992, at Al, A4.
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audits performed for 300 collapsed savings and loans institutions.5
Throughout the 1980s, over 500 savings and loan institutions
failed, 6 and a similar number of banks suffered an equal fate. An
outgrowth of this crisis has been intense public pressure to prosecute
and impose civil liability on the individuals responsible for the failure
of these thrifts. Consequently, attention has increasingly focused on
the liability of accountants," who audited these savings and loan institutions, to financially damaged plaintiffs who were third-parties to
the auditor-client contract.
In response to the current escalation of auditor liability and the
alleged threat to the existence of the accounting profession, the Supreme Court of California ruled in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.9
that it was abandoning the foreseeability approach to accountant
negligence. 10 The foreseeability approach requires that non-client
plaintiffs, in an action for accountant negligence, prove that their use
of the audited statements and the manner in which the statements
were used were specifically foreseeable in the eyes of a reasonably
prudent accouiitant. 11 The Bily Court, instead, ruled that accountants may only be liable for negligence to clients with whom they are
in privity,' and that non-clients who are not in privity with the accountants may recover in an action for negligent misrepresentation
only if they satisfy the requirements of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552.11 Under the so-called "Restatement approach," an auditor may only be liable to a plaintiff that is not a party to the audit
contract if the auditor knows or intends that such third-party or a
class of similar persons will utilize and rely upon the financial

statements. 14
The Restatement approach has many shortcomings. First, it arbitrarily draws a line whereby certain plaintiffs may recover when
5. Susan Schmidt, Ernst & Young Pays $400 Million to Settle Thrift Regulators'
Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al.
6. S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989). This is "more than three-and-a-half
times as many as in the previous 45 years combined." Id.
7. Id.
8. For the purposes of this Comment, accountant and auditor are being used interchangeably. This Comment focuses on the liability that accountants face because of negligent
conduct in their capacity as auditors.
9. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
10. Id. at 774.
11. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
12. 834 P.2d at 747, 774.
13. Id. at 747.
14. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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auditors are negligent, yet denies recovery to other similarly situated
plaintiffs. Second, it fails to recognize that the purpose of an audit is
to assure investors and creditors about the veracity of the financial
position of the client-business as reported in the client's financial
statements. Lastly, the Bily approach benefits the auditor's client,
while failing to deter negligent conduct by auditors that simultaneously harms non-client third-parties.
Part I of this Comment will briefly describe the scope and
objectives of an audit and examine the conflicting conceptions that
auditors, the public, and the judiciary have regarding the responsibilities and duties of an auditor. Part II will explain the three theories currently utilized to determine accountant liability to non-client
third-parties when an audit is conducted negligently. These three
principles are the privity doctrine,1 5 the foreseeability rule,16 and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 approach.1 7 Part III then compares and contrasts the foreseeability approach with the Restatement
approach, and analyzes some of the shortcomings of the Bily court's
reasoning and the Restatement approach that it adopted. Finally,
this Comment concludes that the Bily decision encompasses an unnecessary return to the doctrine of privity in cases of negligent audits. It proposes an alternative solution to the problem of liability to
third-parties for auditor negligence: a return to the foreseeability approach combined with the stricter enforcement of the burdens imposed on plaintiffs in a tort action, and the adoption of uniform, nondiscretionary auditing standards.

I.

THE AUDIT PROCESS

During an audit," the duty of an accountant is to determine
whether or not the financial statements of the client-business comply
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 9 (GAAP) through
15. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. This approach was established in UItramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
16. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text. This was the rule previously used in
California. It was first employed in the case International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
17. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
18. For a general description of the auditing process, see Willis W. Hagen 11, Certified
Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance With GAAP and GAAS,
13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 66-76 (1987) [hereinafter Hagen 11, CPA Liability].
19. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are guidelines reflecting the
consensus among accountants, at a particular time, as to the following: 1) which economic
resources and obligations should be recorded as assets and liabilities by financial accounting;
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an examination of the financial statements of the client in accordance with the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 20 (GAAS). 2
The auditor is responsible for stating in the audit report whether or
not the financial position of the audited business is fairly represented
in the financial statements. 2 If the financial statements do not fairly
represent the financial standing of the client-business, then the auditor must make a statement explaining why a fair representation does
not exist or could not be determined. 3 Misconceptions and ambigui2) which changes in assets and liabilities should be recorded and when they should be recorded; 3) how the assets, liabilities, and changes in them should be measured; 4) what information should be disclosed in financial statements; 5) how the information should be disclosed
in the financial statements; and 6) which financial statements should be prepared. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 1, § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).
GAAP, and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), see infra note 20, are
promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). "The
AICPA is the national association of [Certified Public Accountants] in the United States. The
institute has served the public and its members for over 100 years. Among its functions, the
AICPA develops standards and authoritative guidance on the conduct of audits of financial
information." Failure of Independent CPA's to Identify Fraud, Waste and Mismanagement
and Assure Accurate Financial Position of Troubled S&Ls: HearingBefore the Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 10 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989) [hereinafter S& L Hearing] (statement of Robert May, Chairman, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). Membership in the AICPA is open to anyone with a valid, unrevoked CPA certificate
from a state's board of accountancy. Hagen II, CPA Liability, supra note 18, at 73 n.47.
20. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) constitute the minimum professional standards for conducting an audit. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, § l10.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1972); James L. Costello, Note, The Auditor's Responsibility for Fraud Detection and Disclosure: Do the Auditing Standards Provide a Safe Harbor?,43 ME. L. REv. 265,
273 (1991). GAAS, unlike accounting "procedures," do not define particular acts that must be
performed. I AICPA ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES: U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS, AU § 150.01
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989) [hereinafter U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS]. Instead, GAAS provides "measures of the quality of the performance of those acts and the
objectives to be obtained" by the procedures used. Id.
21. 1 AICPA'PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS, AU § 110.01
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989).
22. See id. at AU § I10.01-.02.
23. GAAS requires that an auditor should make qualifications, disclaimers, or render an
adverse opinion in his report and give the reasons for such action "when an auditor is restricted in scope of his examination, by actions of the client or by other circumstances such as
the timing of his work, the inability to obtain sufficient evidential matter, or inadequacy in
existing accounting records." CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 2, § 509.10 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1988); see also U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 20, at AU § 150.02. Such qualifications, disclaimers or adverse opinions should also be made by the auditor for the following
reasons: I) "[i]f the financial statements are materially affected by a departure from GAAS,"
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 2, § 509.15; 2) "[i]f the auditor cannot satisfy himself as to the reasonableness of
estimates of future events, or if there are multiple and complex uncertainties which cannot be
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ties about the audit process lead to greater liability of accountants

for negligence when audits fail to detect fraud, mismanagement, or
errors and the insolvent client-business cannot pay for the losses of
investors and creditors. 4
When establishing the liability of an auditor on the basis of negligence, two main problems arise. First, the standard of care by

which the auditor should be judged must be determined. Second, the
plaintiffs to whom the auditor may be liable must be ascertained.
A.

The Auditor's Standard of Care

Generally, adhering to the standards of GAAP and GAAS does

not save an auditor from liability for negligence in conducting an
audit.25 The question of due care in a negligence case is one of fact
reasonably estimated, including those that may threaten the client's continued existence," see
id. § 509.21-.26; and 3) "when the auditor detects the presence of errors or possible irregularities, and the auditor remains uncertain whether these errors or possible irregularities will materially affect the financial statements." CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16, § 327.14 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1988). By implication, the auditor may not state that the client's financial statements are a "fair representation" of the financial status of the client if the auditor is restricted
in scope of his examination, by actions of the client or by other circumstances such as the
timing of his work, the inability to obtain sufficient evidentiary matter, or inadequacy in existing accounting records; if the financial statements are materially affected by a departure
from GAAS; if the auditor cannot satisfy himself as to the reasonableness of estimates of
future events; if there are multiple and complex uncertainties which cannot be reasonably
estimated, including those that may threaten the client's continued existence; and if the auditor detects the presence of errors or possible irregularities, and the auditor remains uncertain
whether these errors or possible irregularities will materially affect the financial statements.
24. Generally, an accountant is not a guarantor of the financial statements that are audited. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979). Even properly
performed audits may fail to detect fraud. See S&L Hearing, supra note 19, at 5 (statement
of Carroll Hubbard, Jr., Representative from Kentucky); see also infra note 47.
.25. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) which states that:
In those cases where application of generally accepted accounting principles fulfills
the duty of full and fair disclosure, the accountant need go no further. But if application of accounting principles alone will not adequately inform investors, accountants, as well as insiders, must take pains to lay bare all the facts needed by investors
to interpret the financial statements accurately.
Other recent rulings state that although compliance with GAAS and GAAP is evidence of
reasonable professional care, it is not conclusive. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Maduff
Mortgage Corp. v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 779 P.2d 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Thomas L.
Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants' Liability, I COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 213, 23637 (1988). But cf. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979) (where
defendant auditor complied with GAAS, it satisfied its professional obligations); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("Accountants should not be held
to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession.").
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for the jury to decide 26-i.e. a jury may hold an auditor to a higher
standard of care than mere compliance with GAAP and GAAS.
Therefore, an auditor may be found to be liable for negligence even
though he complied with GAAP and GAAS, especially if the jury
does not fully understand the role of accountants in an audit.
The Bily Court has, however, ruled by implication that GAAP
and GAAS are the standards of professionalism to be applied in
cases involving an auditor's liability to a non-client for a negligent
audit. This inference may be drawn from the court's ruling that accountants may be liable for negligent misrepresentation 2 7 but not
for negligence. 8 When determining the truth or falsity of the audit
opinion or report (which will be the main issue in a negligent misrepresentation lawsuit), the only relevant question is whether or not the
audit was conducted in compliance with GAAP and GAAS. This is
because the only representation that the accountant makes in the
audit report is that the financial statements are in compliance with
GAAP as determined by an audit conducted in compliance with
GAAS.2 9 Thus, in California, an auditor will only be liable to a nonclient if the auditor did not comply with GAAS and/or the client's
financial statements did not comply with GAAP. Consequently, an
auditor may not be held liable under the negligent misrepresentation
rule if his statements about compliance with GAAP and GAAS are
true, even though compliance with GAAS and GAAP may lead to
misrepresentations on the financial statements.
Mere compliance with GAAP and GAAS should be deemed insufficient as a standard of care in determining accountant liability in
all jurisdictions. Compliance with GAAP and GAAS allows the auditor to use too many discretionary judgments,3" the exercise of
26. Gossman, supra note 25, at 236-37; e.g., Evans v. City of Marlin, 986 F.2d 104, 109
(5th Cir: 1993) ("Whether or not the conduct of the Appellees' [sic] amounts to a breach of
the legal standard of due care is a question of fact for the jury."); Smith v. Ferrel, 852 F.2d
1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[in almost all cases, the question of due care ... is
a question for the jury") (citing Parsons v. National Dairy Cattle Congress, 277 N.W.2d 620,
624 (Iowa 1979)); Losey v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 792 F.2d 58, 60 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "it is for the jury to decide whether a plaintiff has failed to observe
and avoid a danger and thus has failed to exercise due care"); Bickel v. City of Downey, 238
Cal. Rptr. 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "due care as an element of negligence
presents a question of fact for the jury") (citing 4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW. § 492, at 2755 (8th ed. 1974)).
27. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
28. Id. at 767.
29. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
30. This issue was raised in Congressional hearings about the Savings & Loan Crisis.
For instance, during the Savings & Loan Crisis, the 1979 AICPA audit guidelines stated that
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which can lead to "creative accounting." 31 GAAP and GAAS allow
the auditor to use discretion to employ a method of financial analysis

that results in the greatest determination of net income and net assets for the auditor's client. Such behavior is not a breach of duty of
care if the method of analysis used is generally accepted by the accounting profession. Furthermore, as financing methods change, the

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has
been slow in further developing accounting standards, thereby forcing auditors to perform accounting functions under nebulous

principles.32
A second problem with using compliance with GAAP and
GAAS as a standard of care is that accountants will only breach
their duty of care if they fail to adhere to standards that they have
established, and which they find generally acceptable. 33 When an industry behaves according to self-established standards that are regarded by the public as inadequate, it should not be surprising that
the members of that industry are held liable for negligence when
they adhered to those standards. This is exactly the situation in
which auditors find themselves, and it is a primary reason why today
they face such great liability. It is also, therefore, unremarkable that
compliance with GAAP and GAAS may not be considered dispositive of a lack of negligence by accountants.
Public perception about the role of auditors is another reason
"auditors 'may visit' construction sites and obtain independent evaluations of the construction
completed," which was something that "should be dure" for major loans. See S&L Hearing,
supra note 19, at 25 (Walter E. Fauntroy, Represcntative from the District of Columbia,
questioning Frederick D. Wolf, Assistant Comptroller of the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)); id. at 175 (written statement of Thomas Myers, President of the accounting firm T.A. Myers & Co.) (such action was rarely taken where it was appropriate). This
vagueness allowed accountants to hide behind professional judgment by not making the extra
effort of visiting a construction site or obtaining an independent evaluation, and led to errors in
calculating reserves for uncollectible loans. See id. at 25.
31. Chaffee, supra note 2, at 889.
32. See, e.g., S&L Hearing, supra note 19, at 5 (statement of Carroll Hubbard, Jr.,
Representative from Kentucky) (stating that the AICPA did not enact adequate auditing standards to prevent many of the errors, and, thereby, losses in the Savings and Loan Crisis); see
id. at 149 (written statement of Russell L. Chupik, Managing Partner of the accounting firm
Greenstein, Logan & Co.).
For a definition and description of the AICPA, see supra note 19 (second paragraph).
33. "While the SEC has [had] the authority to establish GAAP, since 1938, the SEC
has delegated primary responsibility for that function to the AICPA." Chaffee, supra note 2,
at 889 n.253 (citing Note, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate America's Search
for the Perfect Auditor, 52 BROOK.L. REV. 1077, 1100 (1987)); cf. Hagen II, CPA Liability,
supra note 18, at 72-74; supra note 19 (stating that GAAP and GAAS are promulgated by
the AICPA).
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why GAAP and GAAS may be insufficient as a standard of care for

determining an auditor's liability. Through an audit, the auditor
"primarily tests for unintentional mistakes, not fraud." 34 An auditor
must "plan his examination to search for errors3 or irregularities36
that would have a material effect on the financial statements [of the

client-business], and to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of
that examination.""I In doing so, however, the auditor merely analyzes a sample of the total. transactions of the client, 8 making it
nearly impossible for the accountant to detect every unintentional

error or mistake. This cross-section analysis makes it simple for
management to hide fraud from the auditor, especially when the perpetrators are aware of audit procedures.3 ". Too often, the public regards the auditor as the guarantor of the veracity of the financial

statements of his clients,40 which he is not.4 The accountant is
merely a reviewer of financial documents who gives his opinion as to
whether such documents were prepared in compliance with GAAP.4 2
Thus, by regarding an auditor as the guarantor of the veracity of a
client's financial statements, the public may hold the accountant to a
Gossman, supra note 25, at 236.
Errors are "unintentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in
financial statements." U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 20, at AU § 316.02 (emphasis
in original). Errors may involve mistakes in gathering or processing data, incorrect estimates
caused by oversights or misinterpretations, or mistakes in application of accounting principles.
Id.
36. Irregularities are "intentional mistakes or omissions of amounts or disclosures in
financial statements" which include management fraud and defalcations. Id. at AU § 316.03
(emphasis in original). Management fraud is the act of fraudulently reporting financial information in order to render financial statements misleading. Id. Defalcations are misappropriation of assets. Id.
37. Id. at AU § 316.02-.04; see also id. at AU § 230 (regarding an auditor's duty to
perform with due care).
38. Gossman, supra note 25, at 232.
39. Management can override internal controls, partake in collusive acts, or fail to record transactions. See U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 20, at AU § 316.07, .16. Two
commentators state that holding the auditor liable for fraud makes the position of an auditor
intolerable because frauds may be perpetrated by client personnel and go undetected for years
by the directors. Brian K. Kirby & Thomas L. Davies, Accountant Liability: New Exposure
For an Old Profession, 36 S.D. L. REV. 574, 578 (1991) (citation omitted). Managers who
commit fraud are often aware of the audit procedures and their respective limitations. Thus,
they can minimize the chance of discovery by an audit. Gossman, supra note 25, at 236. This
Comment does not concern itself with the issue of whether or not auditors should be detectors
of fraud and liable for such.
40. Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 577.
41. See supra note 24.
42. See U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS. supra note 20, at AU § 110.01; Kirby & Davies,
supra note 39, at 577-78.
34.
35.
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higher standard of care than the accountant believes he can reasonably fulfill.
Nonetheless, auditors are not always innocent victims of management's unscrupulous activities and of the public's misconceptions.
When auditors detect discrepancies or have reservations, they often
fail to make disclosures in the audit report that would provide the
investing public and creditors with the necessary information to enable informed decision-making. The audit statement should furnish a
specific explanation of the actions taken during the audit and the
findings of the auditor.4 Instead, the audit assessment, known as
"'the standard audit report,' has become a 'boiler plate' [that] is
quite inappropriate for communicating the results of the audit .othe
client . . . [and] the investing public." 4" By neglecting this duty of
disclosure, accountants violate the standard of care that they have
established for themselves in GAAS. To avoid liability, the accountant should either insist on the appropriate changes in the financial
statements or qualify the audit opinion as required by GAAP and
GAAS.
Clearly, accountants are often held to a higher standard of care
than simple compliance with GAAP and GAAS because they have
not sufficiently defined their role to the public.' 5 Moreover, they have
failed to enact specific standards that would make the audit process
less discretionary and more uniform. Additionally, they have frequently neglected their duty of disclosure.
One step that could be taken to decrease auditor liability is for
the AICPA to enact more uniform accounting standards, instead of
allowing many discretionary judgments and a choice of alternative
accounting methods for auditors to utilize. Alternatively, perhaps it
is time for Congress to enact federal legislation in this area. If auditors could be judged against national uniform standards, judging
whether or not an auditor is negligent would become a much simpler
process than it currently is under the more ambiguous and discretionary GAAP and GAAS standards. Like the Bily Court, other
courts may now feel compelled to use judicial intervention to remedy
the large amount of potential liability that auditors face. As the Bily
ruling is now the governing principle in California, that state has
now adopted a dangerously inadequate standard of liability in cases
of auditor negligence.
43.
44.
45.

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Chaffee, supra note 2, at 887.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Parties to Whom the Auditor is Responsible

Courts have given the accounting profession the role of a "public watchdog" over the financial transactions of corporate America.4 6
Thus, although the accounting profession has attempted to deny such
responsibility,4 7 auditors are increasingly liable when a company
fails. By rendering an independent, objective evaluation of financial
statements, the auditor provides reasonable assurance that the financial position of the client is fairly represented to the users of the
information.48 In fact, because of the growing need to acquire extensive capital funding for operations of businesses, the accountant's
role is very different today than it was at the time of the adoption of
the privity doctrine.4 9 Although an audit is addressed to management, its primary purpose is to influence the actions of non-client
third-parties by convincing those third-parties that it is safe to extend credit to or invest in the client-business.
At one time the audit was made primarily to inform management
of irregularities and inefficiencies in the business. That function remains one of the principle reasons for the audit. Gradually a need
for independent audits was generated by public ownership of business enterprises and by requirements of the stock exchanges and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Institutional investors, investment specialists, stockholders, and lenders demanded
more and reliable information. It is now well recognized that the
46. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983); cf. Hydroculture, Inc. v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 848 P.2d 856, 860 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (in an action for accounting malpractice,
the defendant accountant adopted the "public watchdog" rationale by arguing that it owed a
duty to the public to report the client's transactions according to GAAP and "that its duty to
the public supersedes any duty to [the client]").
47. See S&L Hearing, supra note 19, at 162 (written statement of William L. Gladstone, Chairman of Arthur Young & Company, quoting THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, Oct. 1987) (stating that an audit cannot
and does not guarantee or provide absolute assurance that the financial statements are reliable
or accurate; and also stating that, instead, GAAP and GAAS serve to confirm that management has primary responsibility for the financial statements and also serve to protect users of
financial statements from placing more reliance on the audit process than is reasonable).
48. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
49. The privity doctrine provides that an auditor's tort liability to a non-client thirdparty exists only where the auditor has a contractual duty to the non-client, i.e. where the nonclient and auditor enter a contract, or where the non-client is specifically designated as a thirdparty beneficiary in the contract between the client and the auditor. See infra notes 54-57 and
accompanying text. When Justice Cardozo adopted the privity doctrine in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), he reasoned that the fledgling accounting industry needed
protection from ruinous liability. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. Cardozo made this
ruling in 1931, before the adoption of modern securities legislation and regulations.
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audited statements are made for the use of third-parties who have
no contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge that companies use audits for many proper business purposes, such as submission to banks and other lending institutions that might advance funds and to suppliers of services and
goods that might advance credit. The SEC [thirty-six] years ago
stated: "The responsibility of the public accountant is not only to
the client who pays his fee, but also to investors, creditors and
others who may rely on the financial statements he certifies." These
uses as well as governmental requirements make financial statements reviewed by independent qualified accountants indispensable.
Government has increasingly utilized accounting as a means to
control business activities. Some examples of such use are public
utility rate regulation and regulation of banks and insurance companies. The SEC has emphasized accountability through disclosure,
accomplished in part by examinations and reports of independent
auditors under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The auditor's function has expanded from that of a watchdog
for management to an independent evaluator of the adequacy and
fairness of financial statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors, and others.50
This use by third-parties certainly should not be considered minor, casual, or subordinate to that of the client. Most businesses now
have their own internal accounting control systems that report the
results of operations to management.5 1 Moreover, federal securities
law requires most businesses with publicly traded securities to undergo an annual independent audit.52
These factors render the independent audit of only secondary
importance to the client. It is, therefore, naive to believe that audited
financial statements are not intended for non-client third-parties to
rely upon. Any rule of liability in auditor negligence cases should
reflect this reality. As will be discussed below, the rule that the Bily
50. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983) (citations omitted).
51. See generally Willis W. Hagen II, Accountants' Common Law Negligence Liability
to Third Parties, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 181, 198 (1988) [hereinafter Hagen II, Common
Law Negligence].
52. Companies whose securities are traded on a national securities exchange, which have
assets of $1 million or more, and which have equity securities held by 500 or more persons
must file with the SEC an annual report containing certified financial statements. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1988).
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Court adopted neglects to incorporate this basic premise.53

II.

THREE APPROACHES TO THE TREATMENT OF NON-CLIENT
THIRD-PARTIES

Three methods are currently used in determining auditor negligence in the United States. They are the privity doctrine, the foreseeability rule, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach.
The following is a brief analysis of each of these methods.
A.

The Privity Doctrine

The privity doctrine in accountant negligence cases was established by the 1931 New York Court of Appeals decision, Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche.5" In Ultramares, Justice Cardozo explained that
privity, close enough to create tort liability to a third-party, exists if
the third-party would be deemed a third-party beneficiary under a
contract analysis.55 The court thereby refused to allow recovery by
unspecified third-parties which were outside the scope of the contract
between the accountant and his client.5" Thus, in order for a nonclient plaintiff to recover against an accountant under the privity
doctrine, the non-client must have had a contract with the accountant or have been a specifically-named third-party beneficiary to the
contract between the auditor and his client. Cardozo reasoned that
the non-client plaintiff could not recover against the defendant-accountant because the audit was primarily intended to benefit the client-business.5 7 Cardozo created an exception to the tort rule of foreseeability, rather than acceding to that approach. He felt that the
economic and social consequences (most importantly, the possibility
of imposing ruinous liability upon the fledgling accounting profession) warranted deferral of the decision concerning the adoption of a
foreseeability approach to the legislature. 8
In 1985, the New York Court of Appeals slightly narrowed the
Ultramares privity doctrine in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.5 9 In Credit Alliance, the court adopted what has been
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
wrought
59.

See infra part III.B.
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
See id. at 446-47.
See id. at 448.
Id. at 446. But see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 447 ("A change so revolutionary, if expedient, must be
by legislation.").
483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
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called by some a near-privity approach"0 by developing a three-prong
test to determine whether accountants have a limited privity relationship sufficient to hold them liable to non-client third-party plaintiffs. The three factors used by the court were the following: 1) the
auditors must be aware that the financial statements will be used for
a particular purpose; 2) the plaintiff must be "known" to the auditors and the plaintiff must be intended to rely on the financial statements; and 3) there must be conduct by the auditors which links
them to the plaintiff, demonstrating the auditors' understanding of
the reliance by the plaintiff.6 1
The strict-privity and the near-privity doctrines are used in at
least nine states.62 Many jurisdictions, however, find a privity approach to be undesirable. One reason is that it fails to consider the
manner in which many business transactions are structured, and,
therefore, excludes many deserving plaintiffs;"3 that is, although the
negligent conduct is the same, and the injuries sustained are the
same as those sustained by non-clients who were in privity with the
auditor, non-client plaintiffs who lack privity will be prohibited from
receiving compensation from the auditor for their injuries.
Many business arrangements with professionals involved several
parties and two or more interrelated contracts ....
The substance
of the transaction, although not the form, is to create a relationship
between the professional and the third-party. In such cases it would
be economically wasteful and practically cumbersome to require
the third-party to hire an independent advisor. He is not getting
something for nothing because the cost of the professional's services
60. This approach has been labelled a near-privity rule because the court stated that an
auditor may not be liable for negligence to a non-client third-party unless the non-client plaintiff could "demonstrate the existence of a relationship between the parties sufficiently approaching privity." Id. at 119. This Comment does not differentiate between privity and nearprivity; hereinafter, the use of the word privity in this Comment means both of these doctrines
(since they almost always have the same result), unless specifically distinguished as being one
or the other.
61. Id. at 118.
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie Supp. 1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 225, § 450/30.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b) (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-26-12 (Supp. 1993); Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So.
2d 390 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho
1989); Citizens Nat'l Bank of Wisner v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989);
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985); Landell v.
Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919).
63. Susan L. Martin, If Privity Is Dead, Let's Resurrect It: Liability of Professionals
To Third Parties For Economic Injury Caused By Negligent Misrepresentation, 28 AM. Bus.
L.J. 649, 677 (1990).
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have been figured into the overall job and, therefore, he is paying
for them indirectly. The privity rule does not, however, provide protection for those plaintiffs .... 64
Moreover, the rationale for the privity approach no longer exists because the accounting profession is not the fledgling industry that it
was when Ultramares was decided; the accountant is not solely responsible to the client anymore, but also serves the public through its
"watchdog" role. 65 Consequently, many states have abandoned the
privity rule in favor of the Restatement approach. 66
B.

The Restatement Approach

Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an auditor may be
liable to a non-client third-party plaintiff only if the auditor knows
or intends that such third-party or a class of similar persons will
utilize and rely upon the financial statements.6" To recover for negligent misrepresentation, the third-party plaintiff must also prove reliance on the financial statements in a transaction that the auditor

intended to influence, in a transaction that the auditor knew the client intended to influence, or in a substantially similar transaction. 8
Comparing the Restatement rule adopted in Bily to the privity
rule of Credit Alliance, it is apparent that, under the Restatement

rule, the non-client plaintiff must overcome most of the same burdens that were established in the privity rule. 69 The only difference
64. Id. at 677-78.
65. See supra notes 46, 49-50 and accompanying text.
66. "At least 17 state and federal decisions have endorsed the [Restatement] rule in this
and related contexts." See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 759 n.9 (citations
omitted).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1978). The full text of section 552
reads as follows:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) [T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the
person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction. ...
68. Id. § 552(2)(b).
69. Compare the test established in Credit Alliance. supra text accompanying note 61,
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between the privity rule in Ultramares and the Restatement rule is
that the Restatement rule does not require that the auditor specifically know the identity of the relying third-party plaintiff.70 The
Credit Alliance rule mandates that the plaintiff be "a known party"
to the auditors.7 1 In contrast, the Restatement rule requires that the
relying third-party plaintiff be a person or member of a limited
group that is known to the auditor and that either the auditor in-

tends to influence or the auditor knows that the client intends to influence."2 The expansion of the privity rule in the Restatement, however, is only slight; the potential number of investors and creditors
that may invest in or extend credit to the auditor's client is not limited. Thus, to recover under the Restatement approach, these thirdparties will have to make both their existence and identity known to
the auditor. Therefore, under either rule, the auditor must specifi-

cally know the plaintiff at the time of the transaction.
The remaining elements of the two tests are essentially the
same. Under the Credit Alliance rule, the auditor must be aware
that his work product is to be used for a particular purpose, and that
the plaintiff is intended to rely upon the work product in furtherance
of that purpose. Furthermore, the Credit Alliance rule requires that
some link exist between the auditor and the plaintiff that justifies the
plaintiff's reliance. 3 Similarly, the Restatement rule requires that
the plaintiff has actually relied on the information and that the audi-

tor knew that the information was intended to influence a transacwith the elements of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, supra note 67.
70. Under the Restatement rule, for the accountant to be liable, he must be actually
aware that the non-client will rely upon the information the accountant prepared, but does not
have to be aware of the identity of the relying party. See, e.g., Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356
S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1987) (stating that under the Restatement rule, "liability is limited to a
foreseeable person or limited class of persons for whom the information was intended, directly
or indirectly"); Pahre v. Auditor of Iowa, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988) (holding that an
accountant who prepared financial statements for a loan company was not liable under the
Restatement rule to the guarantor of the loan company's thrift certificates, although the guarantor used the financial statements because the financial statements were intended solely for
the loan company's internal use when made, and were not intended to be disseminated to
others such as the plaintiff guarantor); Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockier, P.C. v. Rose, 436
N.W.2d 70, 82 (Mich. 1989) (stating that "under § 552, the knowledge of the supplier of the
information [regarding the plaintiff's reliance] . . . and the particular transaction that the
supplier or the recipient ... intends to influence takes on critical significance in determining
the scope of the supplier's liability").
71. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y.
1985).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2).
73. See Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 118.

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:243

tion.14 Either the auditor or the client-business may intend that the

information influence the transaction.7 5 If the auditor or client intended the audited financial statements (or representations therein)
to influence the transaction, then the plaintiff's reliance on those
statements with regard to the transaction is obviously justified. Thus,
it is clear that the applications of the privity approach and Restatement rule are virtually identical.
C.

The Foreseeability Approach

Some courts felt that the Restatement approach did not sufficiently compensate innocent third-parties for their losses when an

auditor was negligent.76 The main criticism is that the Restatement
approach arbitrarily limits the class of plaintiffs eligible to recover
when an auditor is negligent. 7 One commentator states that the Restatement rule distinguishes between two different groups of plain-

tiffs that both rely on audited financial statements where no distinction actually exists.7 1 "[A] creditor unknown to an auditor . . . will
not rely less on a set of audited financial statements than a creditor
who is known by the auditor."7 " The foreseeability rule serves to
remedy this perceived problem of the Restatement rule. The foreseeability approach requires that the reasonably prudent accountant
reasonably and specifically foresee the relying third-party plaintiffs
and the uses for the audited statements."0

In 1986, the California Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of
foreseeability in cases of accountant negligence and overruled the
well-established privity rule. 81 In InternationalMortgage v. John P.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2).
75. Id.
76. Four states had adopted the foreseeability approach since its proposal. International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986),
overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Touche Ross Co. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461
A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis.
1983); cf. Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (using the Restatement approach, but finding that the "reasoning of the cases and
commentators urging adoption of the foreseeability test [is] persuasive").
77. Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 591-92; see James W. Zisa, Guarding the Guardians. Expanding Auditor Negligence Liability to Third-Party Users ofFinancial Information,
11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 123, 160 (1989).
78. Zisa, supra note 77, at 160.
79. Id.
80. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 153-55.
81. International Mortgage Co. v. John Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
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Butler Accountancy Corp., the defendant accounting firm had negligently audited the financial statements of Westside Mortgage, Inc.82
Westside became insolvent, causing one of its creditors, International
Mortgage, to sue the accounting firm for negligence.8 3 The court
found that the accountant was liable, despite the fact that the accountant lacked knowledge of the plaintiffs existence at the time of
the audit, had never contacted the plaintiff, and was unaware of the
plaintiff's reliance on the audited financial statements. 4 The court
ruled that "an independent auditor owes a duty of care to reasonably
foreseeable plaintiffs who rely on negligently prepared and issued unqualified audited financial statements,' 8 5 and that a failure to fulfill
any such duty is negligence for which the auditor may be held liable."6 Thus, before Bily, the foreseeability rule applied to cases of
accountant negligence in California.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE BILY DECISION: FORESEEABILITY V. PRIVITY

The Supreme Court of California, sitting in Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., rejected the foreseeability test of InternationalMortgage and adopted the Restatement approach instead. 8 The Bily
Court ruled that an auditor may only be held liable to its client for
general negligence that occurs during an audit, and that the auditor
may only be held liable to the specifically intended beneficiaries of
the audit for negligent misrepresentation.8 The court gave a number of reasons for its decision. First, given "the difficult and potentially tenuous causal relationships between audit reports and economic losses . . . the [accounting profession] faces potential liability
far out of proportion to its fault." 89 Second, the sophistication of
business parties that become third-party plaintiffs allows the use of
contract to privately order the risk, in lieu of employing tort theory.9 0 Third, the asserted advantages of the foreseeability approach
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
609, 615
Carolina
sive than
90.

Id. at 219.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 747.
Id. at 761; cf Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d
(N.C. 1988) (In adopting the Restatement approach, the Supreme Court of North
rejected the reasonable foreseeability test because it imposes "liability more expanan accountant should be expected to bear.").
Bily, 834 P.2d at 761.
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are unlikely to occur.9 1
The Bily Court, however, fails to recognize that the rights of
small investors and small creditors are most likely to be neglected
and infringed upon by the Restatement rule. Moreover, no distinction should be made among the persons to whom auditors should be
liable. In suits against auditors for negligent misrepresentation to
non-clients, no such distinction is necessary because the misrepresentation in the financial statements (that the financial statements accurately reflect the financial position of the client business, when, in
fact, they do not) results from the negligence in the conduct of the
audit. Additionally, the burdens of proof on the plaintiff under the
Restatement rule are so high that it will be the rare exception that
non-clients will be able to recover. Consequently, under the Bily ruling, no deterrence against negligence exists. The auditor knows that
negligent overstatements of the client's worth will benefit the client,
and that the client, as the only possible plaintiff that may sue the
auditor on a negligence claim, will not sue because he has benefitted
from the negligent overstatement. The analysis that follows more
fully explains why the Bily Court's reasoning is unpersuasive.
A.

Is Liability Really Out of Proportion to Fault?

The major premise of the Bily Court's decision in limiting recovery for general negligence to the auditor's client, and implementing the Restatement approach for liability to non-client plaintiffs,
was that the auditor's potential liability would otherwise be "far out
of proportion to its fault."9 2 The court began by asserting that the
audit is conducted in a client-controlled environment, and that "few
CPA audits would be immune from criticism" when the complex audit process is viewed from the perspective of "20-20 hindsight."9 3 In
its opinion, the court also stated that accountants should not be held
responsible if they comply with GAAS and GAAP because the many
rules that accountants must follow are "broadly phrased and readily
subject to different constructions." 9
The court's conclusion that the liability of auditors is disproportionate to their fault is unpersuasive. First, the court should not use
the fact that the accounting industry lacks clear, uniform standards
91. Id.
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. Bily, 834 P.2d at 763 (citing John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1956 (1988)).
94. See id.
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as an argument to excuse liability where the industry is allowed to
regulate itself.9 5 It is ironic that in upholding GAAS and GAAP as
the standard of care for auditors, the court admitted some of the
main weaknesses of using compliance with GAAS and GAAP as the
standard of care: compliance with GAAS and GAAP fails to supply
auditors with a rigid and uniform framework for the conduct of an
audit, which allows too many discretionary judgments and "creative
accounting.""8 Second, the negligent acts of auditors have resulted in
losses to third-parties and the auditors should be held culpable for
such losses. Third, auditors have the ability to limit their losses.
1. Examples of Accountant Negligence
Reality paints an unflattering picture regarding the negligent
conduct in which auditors have been involved. Their liability has
arisen not merely because they have failed to follow ambiguous or
discretionary guidelines, but also because they have failed to follow
the clearest and simplest of auditing standards.
The events leading up to the Savings and Loan Crisis are very
illuminating as to this point. The negligent acts (or failures to act) of
97
accountants in conducting audits of failed thrifts were numerous.
For instance:
In an astoundingly high percentage of failed thrifts, effective real
estate lending policy and underwriting controls were virtually nonexistent. Effective loan underwriting calls for an elaborate system
of documentation and appropriate analysis to evidence management's prudent decision to approve a loan. Such documentation
might include, for example, financial statements on the borrower,
tax returns, feasibility analyses for a commercial real estate project, appraisal reports, pro forma projections and other data germane to approving the proposed project. Many failed thrifts either
lacked the documentation necessary to evidence a prudent loan decision or else such documentation was inaccurate or poorly prepared and analyzed. A prudent auditor, following AICPA guidelines, which were then in existence, should have been able to
identify the majority of problems in this area."
95.
96.
97.

See supra part I.A. "
See Bily, 834 P.2d at 763; supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO

THE CHAIRMAN,

CPA
CPA AUDITS TO IDENTIFY AND REPORT SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS
LOAN PROBLEMS (1989), reprinted in S&L Hearing, supra note 19, at 214-22.
98. S&L Hearing, supra note 19, at 172 (written statement of Thomas Myers, President

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
AUDIT QUALITY: FAILURES OF
AND
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Another example of negligent conduct is that, in many thrifts,
auditors failed to follow up on "significant amounts of restructured
loans which [we]re almost ipso facto a [sic] problem loan [sic]." 99
Additionally, the mishandling of real estate appraisals was a widespread occurrence in the audits of failed savings and loan
institutions.
"The independent auditor should understand and consider the basis' [sic] of the appraised value and the factors used in arriving at
such value." . . . Often, in evaluating a commercial real estate loan,
the independent auditor would look at appraised value in the file
and, so long as such value exceeded the recorded amount of the
loan, determine that no loss need be reflected by the institution.
The notion of deferring to the opinion of the appraiser as to value,
when often, such appraisers were improperly connected with the
lender or borrower can clearly lead to poor decisions reflecting the
ultimate exposure to the lender. Time after time, auditors of failed
institutions depended on valuations exhibited in appraisals that
were either fraudulently or incompetently prepared.100
Furthermore, "[i]n some cases, CPAs did not report serious regulatory violations." ' Overall,
[t]he presence of property flips (which are easily detected by title
searches), poor monitoring of loan disbursements, bloated appraisals, out of territory lending, lack of borrower equity, and "related
of the accounting firm T.A. Myers & Co.).
99. Id. at 28 (statement of Frederick D. Wolf, Assistant Comptroller of the General
Accounting Office); see also id. at 61 (statement of Thomas Myers, President of the accounting firm T.A. Myers & Co.). "In many instances appraisals were either absent or exhibited
distorted appraisal methodology that derived values which were grossly inflated. The prudent
independent auditor should have been able to detect such abuses." Id. at 174 n. (written statement of Thomas Myers, President of the accounting firm T.A. Myers & Co.).
Moreover, professional standards require the auditor to obtain independent corroboration
of key management assertions, which is a time-consuming but necessary audit function. Id. at
193 (GAO Report on The Need to Improve Auditing in Savings and Loan Institutions). The
auditors often neglected to obtain such independent corroboration and would, instead, rely on
management's unsubstantiated oral assertions that problem loans were collectible. Id. Thus,
many auditors have clearly failed to comply with professional standards.
100. Id. at 176 (written statement of Thomas Myers, President of the accounting firm
T.A. Myers & Co.).
101. Id. at 38 (statement of Richard H. Lehman, Representative from California, quoting Frederick D. Wolf, Assistant Comptroller of the General Accounting Office); id. at 176-77
(written statement of Thomas Myers, President of the accounting firm T.A. Myers & Co.)
(Auditors failed to report and follow up on excessive loans to single borrowers and related
parties, and failed to note "'formal regulatory actions, such as cease and desist orders'" demanding that the savings and loan institution terminate "'unsafe and unsound operations, and
in one case, non-compliance with those orders.' ").
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party" lending are all easily ascertainable warning signals for
fraud, that, in many instances, the independent auditor should have
acted upon, but didn't.10 2
Thus, even when information was client-controlled and there was client fraud, the independent auditor could have, should have, and,
most likely, would have detected the fraud if the audit was not conducted in a negligent manner.
These are but a few illustrations of the negligence committed by
auditors. They indicate that the increase in auditor liability is not
solely the product of undetectable client fraud, or unclear or vague
standards that are subject to a variety of constructions, as the Bily
Court alleges. In the Bily case, the alleged negligent acts of the accountants were more than a failure to follow broad standards. Arthur Young had given Osborne Computer Corporation clean audit
reports for its 1981 and 1982 financial statements." 3 The plaintiffs'
expert witness identified more than forty deficiencies in the audit.1 0 4
The liabilities of Osborne in 1982 were understated by $3 million,
making Osborne's apparent $69,000 profit nearly a $3 million loss in
actuality.10 5 Arthur Young had, in fact, discovered "material weaknesses in the company's accounting controls, but failed to report its
discovery to management."10 6 Arthur Young had also found deviations from GAAP, but failed to disclose them.1 0 7 Additionally, probably the clearest breach of a duty to disclose by Arthur Young occurred when one of its senior auditors uncovered
$1.3 million in unrecorded liabilities including failures to account
for customer rebates, returns of products, etc. Although the auditor
recommended that a letter be sent to the company's board of directors disclosing material weaknesses in the company's internal accounting controls, his superiors at Arthur Young did not adopt the
recommendation; no weaknesses were disclosed. 108
Instead, Arthur Young issued an unqualified audit report.10 9
102. Id. at 186 (written statement of Thomas Myers, President of the accounting firm
T.A. Myers & Co.).
103. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747-48.
104. Id. at 748.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. It appears to be common for auditors to issue an unqualified audit report when
there are substantial irregularities or uncertainties about a client's financial statements. See,
e.g., First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 10-11 (Fla. 1990) (audi-
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The above examples demonstrate how accountants are often lax

in adhering to GAAS and/or reporting violations of GAAP. 10 It
should not be surprising that auditors face greater liability for failing
to make the disclosures of irregularities, errors, and uncertainties
that may materially affect the audited financial statements, and
which are mandated by ,the standards promulgated by the
AICPA. 1 1
2.

The Fallacy of "Limitless Financial Exposure"

The Bily Court further asserts that awards for damages for the
economic losses of third-parties raise the specter of increased litigation and "limitless financial exposure.""' 2 The court also points out
that when a business entity becomes insolvent, the auditor usually
remains as the only possible solvent defendant.11 3
It may be true that, in many cases, the business entity no longer
exists and that the accountant is left as a possible, if not the only,
solvent defendant. 1 4 However, this fact should not detract from the
auditor's blameworthiness. The financial exposure of the accountant
is not limitless. The client uses an audit to secure funds from creditors and investors. However, the client does not have an infinite abiltor gave unqualified audit report and affirmatively stated that the client had no debts to any
banks, even though the client had total liabilities of $1,296,823, $750,000 of which was owed
to banks); National City Bank v. Coopers & Lybrand, 409 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (defendant auditor gave clean audit report, even though questions had arisen as to
whether or not the audited credit corporation had acquired valid title to $380,000,000 of receivables from its parent retail department store company); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 316-18 (Miss. 1987) (defendant auditor issued an unqualified
audit report even though (1) it knew about the payment of a "highly irregular, if not illegal
dividend"; (2) it knew about a probably illegal $200,000 loan to the client's former parent
company four days after the parent divested itself of the client; (3) it knew about the improbable collection of close to $300,000 worth of loans and receivables from a company that the
auditor knew was unlikely to be able to continue its operations; and (4) knew about, and failed
to account for, loan proceeds that were used illegally by a customer of the client); Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 362 (Wis. 1983) (defendant auditor
gave clean audit report and subsequently discovered there were several material errors in the
financial statements totalling over $400,000); see supra note 44 and accompanying text (stating that the audit opinion has become a "boiler plate" statement instead of a means of
disclosure).
110. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 23.
112. Bily, 834 P.2d at 763.
113. Id.
114. Gossman, supra note 25, at 237 n.126; see Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 595
(stating that "any attempted recovery against the [client] is probably fruitless, as the [client]
is most likely financially defunct").
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ity to absorb these funds.' 1 5 The potential for auditor liability to
third-parties will be limited by the client's debt-handling ability."'
Liability diminishes with the passage of time because the usefulness
of an audit declines as time passes and the financial situation of the
client changes." 7 Additionally, the auditor is protected by the adversary process. The plaintiff will not attain recovery if he does not satisfy the burdens of proof imposed on him in a tort case. Clearly, the
plaintiff should only be able to recover the damages that he can
prove were caused by reliance on the negligently -audited financial
statements, and for which the accountant cannot prove a defense." 8
Thus, the Bily Court's characterization of accountant liability resulting from negligent audits as "limitless" is clearly overstated.
The Bily majority also expressed its fear that feigned reliance
claims" 9 may add to the auditor's already "potentially limitless" liability. 12 0 This problem should similarly be disposed of by the nature
of the trial adversary process. The burdens of proof and other inherent limitations imposed on a plaintiff in a tort case protect the defendant auditor.' The relying third-party must prove that the accountant failed to comply with GAAP, adhere to GAAS, or
otherwise act reasonably under the circumstances. 2 ' The third-party
plaintiff must prove that he reasonably relied on the audited financial statements,' 2 3 that the misinformation led him to decide to enter
the transaction, 2 4 and that such reliance caused his losses. 2 5 Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his damages were
caused by reliance on specific inaccurate data, as opposed to merely
proving there was a mistake somewhere in the entire financial re115. John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1946 & n.95 (1988).
116. See id. In other words, the auditor's total potential liability is equal to the value of
debt issued during the time period during which it is reasonable to rely on the audited financial
statements, plus the value of stock shares issued during that same period of time.
117. Id.
118. See infra notes 122-37 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the plaintiff's
burden of proving causation, and defenses available for the auditor's use in limiting liability).
119. Bily, 834 P.2d at 764 & n.12.
120. Id. at 763-64. "[A]llowing third-party recovery for the economic losses may create
moral hazards ....
[S]uch problems are largely of the ex post variety; parties ... may make
fraudulent or exaggerated claims in order to recover from the defendant." Siliciano, supra
note 115, at 1945.
121. Hagen 11, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 208.
122. Id. at 208-09; Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 597.
123. See infra note 127.
124. Paschall, supra note 3, at 706; see infra note 127.
125. Bily, 834 P.2d at 777-78 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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port. 12 6 Courts will disallow claims where plaintiffs fail to satisfy
these burdens of proof,12 7 and disallow recovery by misusers that fail
to comprehend the true nature of the audit report.12 8
The Bily Court's adoption of the Restatement rule implies a
lack of faith in the trial adversary system, most especially the role of
the jury. The Restatement rule requires a ruling on the question of
auditor liability as a matter of law-i.e. whether the plaintiff was a
part of a limited group specifically foreseen by the auditor. In contrast, the foreseeability rule requires the jury to decide whether the
plaintiff was foreseeable in the eyes of a reasonably prudent auditor,
and therefore is a question of fact for a jury. Thus, the ruling in Bily
may be the product of "[c]orporate fears [that] ...[j]uries are sympathetic to plaintiffs, and they distrust defendants. [Corporations]
maintain that jury trials too often are used to force monied defendants to redistribute the wealth. 1 2 9
The Bily Court's mistrust of juries, however, is misplaced.
[C]orporate America's fear of juries may be overblown. Three independent studies of jury verdicts and jurors' attitudes completed
within the last year suggest that the litigation explosion is on the
wane. In fact, the studies show that plaintiffs are actually losing a
greater proportion of cases today than they have in many years.
Plaintiffs won 63 % of all personal injury claims against businesses
in 1988; in 1992, they won only 54% of them, according to a study
released in November [1993] by Jury Verdict
Publications ....
Jury Verdict's study ... also refutes the popularly held notion
that juries' monetary awards are increasingly out of control. On the
contrary, awards have remained relatively constant in the past five
years. "The notion that juries are wild, unpredictable, and capricious is not true" . . . . "Plaintiff bias has been overstated."180
Thus, the adoption of the Restatement rule, which takes the question
of auditor liability away from the jury, is unnecessary. Furthermore,
126. G. Stephen Diab, Comment, Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland: Accountants' Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 1459, 1466-67 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 748 n.2 ("One plaintiff, Richard L. King, had not received or read the Arthur Young audit report and, therefore, could not have relied on it in
making his investment .... The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in King's favor, finding the absence of reliance fatal to his claim.").
128. Zisa, supra note 77, at 172; Diab, supra note 126, at 1472.
129. Linda Himelstein, Should Business Be Afraid of Juries?: The Stereotype of Outof-Control Robin Hoods-May Be Outdated, Bus. WK., Nov. 8, 1993, at 100.
130. Id.
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there are many defenses available to the accountant. The best de-

fense for the accountant is that he acknowledged his responsibility
and exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. 131 The accountant can also obtain partial indemnification where the client or

its management contributed to the misrepresentation."

2

More often

than not, however, the auditor is held liable for the entire amount of
plaintiff's loss because the courts do not apportion the damages, 3 3 or
because the client is insolvent. 3 " Still, an auditor can seek several
liability so that he is only liable for his share of fault.13 5 The defendant auditor may also be able to eliminate or reduce damages through
the defenses of contributory or comparative negligence.' 3 Moreover,

the statute of limitations, which ordinarily runs from the point of
reliance, also protects the defendant accountant.'3 7
Clearly, there are numerous safeguards built into the litigation
process that will prevent defendant accountants from being liable for
131. Costello, supra note 20, at 297. A starting point would be showing compliance with
GAAP and GAAS. Moreover, the auditor may have to do more than comply with GAAP and
GAAS in certain circumstances because compliance with GAAP and GAAS may be regarded
as insufficient as a standard of care. See supra part I.A. "This means ... [that the auditor
must] recogniz[e] that under certain circumstances auditors must design audit procedures and
tests beyond that which a normal GAAS audit requires, such as ... independently verifying
management representations .... " Costello, supra note 20, at 297.
132. Hagen II, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 209.
133. Diab, supra note 126, at 1467.
134. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
135. Chaffee, supra note 2, at 891. Similar reform proposals have already been made.
For instance, in January 1993, a bill entitled the Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act
(SPERA) was introduced in Congress. H.R. 417, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). SPERA proposed to replace the current system of joint and several liability for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 with proportionate liability if the defendant is found to not have made a
material misrepresentation with actual knowledge of falsity or omission of material information. H.R. 417 § 3. Although the bill was not passed, it is indicative of a general trend towards
lobbying for several liability by accountants.
For an in-depth analysis of several liability and comparative fault principles on the issue
of auditor liability, see Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third
Partiesfor Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM.
Bus. L.J. 345 (1992).
136. Hagen 11, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 209; Kirby & Davies, supra
note 39, at 598.
137. Mark D. Boveri & Brent E. Marshall, Recent Decisions, Tort Law-The Enlarging Scope of Auditors' Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 281, 287
(1983). A plaintiff must generally commence his lawsuit within two years after his reliance on
the audited financial statements, or else his action will be time-barred. See Allan B. Ellis,
Malpractice Accrual: Adherence to the Common Law in ProfessionalNegligence Actions, 19
IDAHO L. REV. 69, 71-72 (1983) (citing Alexander & Baldwin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 385 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976);
Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967)).
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fraudulent claims. If audit reports were not a substantial factor in
the decisions of investors and lenders to lend or extend credit, then
businesses would have little need for independent auditing services.13 8 The lenders and creditors that are not specifically foreseen
by the auditor are no less induced to rely on the audited financial
statements than large banks and institutional investors. The small
lenders and investors are probably more reliant on the audited financial statements in their lending and investing decisions, and the auditor and its client know this.1 9 Thus, the Bily Court cannot justify a
rule of liability that arbitrarily deprives parties that truly suffer injury, especially when alternatives are available. Adopting the Restatement rule undermines, and expresses a lack of faith in, the adversary system. "Even if the[] unfortunate consequences [asserted by
the court] could be- demonstrated, the remedy should come in the
form of carefully crafted legislation, not wholesale curtailment of a
legal duty."' 4 In Bily, the Supreme Court of California has established arbitrary limitations on a potential plaintiff's ability to recover
in a negligence action in order to solve a perceived tort-reform
problem.
B.

The Private Ordering of Risk

In its decision, the Bily Court assumed that the third-party
plaintiffs in accounting liability actions are normally sophisticated
commercial enterprises. 41 The court then expressed its belief that all
third-parties should, therefore, bear the loss for their own risks, or
bargain with the client and auditor to make themselves specifically
foreseeable parties.1 42
138. Bily, 834 P.2d at 778 (Kennard, J.,dissenting).
139. For instance, small lenders and investors rarely possess the large research staff and
resources that many institutional investors employ in gathering information and data to make
investment decisions. Small investors and lenders will rarely have direct access in communications with a business's chief executive officer or chief financial officer, which is common with
many institutional investors and large banks. The small lenders and investors are more reliant
on the financial statements of the client because they are, by definition, small and lack the
resources to obtain information to which large institutional investors and creditors have access.
140. Bily, 834 P.2d at 775. However, it is "[tlhe judiciary [that] is usually responsible
for the final determination [of this issue], since state legislatures seldom pass laws stating
specifically the conditions under which an accountant may be sued." Paschall, supra note 3, at
696.
141. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765; Gossman, supra note 25, at 229; Siliciano, supra note 115,
at 1955 (Almost all creditors in negligent accounting cases are "banks, commercial creditors,
or trade creditors" which "routinely evaluate the probable risks associated with contemplated
transactions.").
142. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765.
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Although sophisticated investors and creditors may not need

protection from misstated financial statements, the court's reasoning
is flawed because many creditors and investors are not sophisticated. 143 Unlike the investors in the era of the 1920s during which
the Ultramares case was decided,14 4 many of today's investors lack
the sophistication, ability, and resources to obtain additional information about a corporation's financial health from other sources." 5
"These investors may be forced to rely on the accountant's statement
alone and, therefore, may need the additional protection provided by
expanding accountant liability to third-parties.""14 "Th[e lack of
protection under the Restatement rule] is illogical, considering that
the same standards of care must be observed regardless of the identity of the actual recipient." 14 7 While large investors will be known
to the auditor or possess enough clout to be able to bargain with the
client and auditor for protection under the Restatement approach,
small, individual investors who are unknown to the accountant will
be left to bear the risk of their reliance.
1. The Inadequacy of Federal Securities Laws in Cases of
Negligent Audits
The Bily Court argued that the existing federal securities
protect investors and creditors against fraud and gross neglilaws
148

143. Chaffee, supra note 2, at 875.
144. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), was decided after the
Stock Market Crash of 1929, but before the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
145. See Chaffee, supra note 2, at 875.
146. Id.; see also Bily, 834 P.2d at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("In short, the majority's rule is one that protects the wealthy and financially savvy at the expense of those innocent
investors and lenders whose only faults are their modest means and their willingness to place
their trust in audit reports."). Investors and creditors that do not invest large amounts of
money or extend a large amount of credit to the auditor's client probably cannot afford to
engage in sophisticated financial analyses, or pay for their own audit because the cost of doing
so would be prohibitive. Thus, the Bily rule implies that only wealthy non-clients should be
able to recover when an auditor's negligence causes the non-clients' losses; the auditor is more
likely to know about wealthy non-clients because of the amount of money involved in such nonclients' transactions with the client or because the wealthy non-client possesses the financial
leverage to negotiate to hold the auditor liable.
147. Paschall, supra note 3, at 724 n.172 (quoting Albert G. Besser, Privity-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507,
527 (1976)).
148. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) (regarding civil liabilities
on account of false registration statement); id. § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988) (regarding civil
liabilities arising in connection with prospectuses and communications); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988) (regarding liability for use of manipulative and
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gence, and put auditors on notice as to the "extent of [their] potential liability exposure. '"149 The court apparently perceived that the
securities laws would be adequate to protect plaintiffs that would not
succeed in a lawsuit under the Restatement rule. The problem with
these laws, however, is that they provide much greater difficulty for
a non-client plaintiff to prevail against a defendant-accountant.
Federal statutes create liability for accountants only under very
limited circumstances. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") allows recovery against an accountant when third-parties rely on an audit opinion in a registration statement '5" or prospectus.15 1 The plaintiff cannot recover in an action under section 11
of the Securities Act if the auditor "had no reasonable ground to
believe and did not believe . . . that the [false or misleading] state'
ments [in a registration statement] ... were untrue."152
Thus, under
section 11 of the Securities Act, which only applies to falsity in a
registration statement,1 53 a plaintiff does not have to prove scienter
or negligence; rather the burden of proof rests on the accountant to
show due diligence to absolve himself. 5 4 More importantly, a nonclient plaintiff is unlikely to succeed in a claim under section 11 because, in order to be liable, the auditor must have sold or offered to
sell a security. 5 In an action under section 12, which deals with
deceptive devices); id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988) (regarding liability for misleading statements); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993) (regarding prohibition against employment of manipulative or deceptive devices).
149. Bily, 834 P.2d at 760.
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
151. See id. § 771.
152. See id. § 77k(b)(3)(C).
153. See id. § 77k(a). A "registration statement" is a "[d]ocument required by the Securities Act of 1933 of most companies wishing to issue securities to the public . . . . The
statement discloses financial data, purpose of securities offering, and other items of interest to
potential investors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (6th ed. 1990).
154. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1494
(N.D. Cal. 1992); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2); see, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 532 (5th Cir.
1992) (accountant which prepared financial statements used in limited partnership investment
transactions could not be liable under 15 U.S.C. § 771 for sale of unregistered securities because it was not a "seller"); Riedel v. Acutote of Colorado, 773 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) ("those who merely give 'gratuitous advice' or professionals, such as attorneys or
accountants, whose participation is confined to providing professional services" are not
"seller[s]" as to be liable under § 12 of Securities Act of 1933); Dawe v. Main St. Mgmt. Co.,
738 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Mass. 1990) (defendant accountant could not be liable under Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2) where it performed its "ordinary accounting services in connection
with the private placement memorandum" for a limited partnership); In re Crazy Eddie Sec.
Litig., 714 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (defendant accounting firm was not liable
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false statements in a prospectus, the auditor must have committed at
least gross negligence for the plaintiff to recover. 15' Additionally,
under either section 11 or section 12, only a person who purchased

the security from the auditor may maintain a cause of action.' 5 '
Hence, these provisions will be of no use where, for example, a small
creditor suffers losses as a result of relying on assertions made pursuant to a negligent audit.
In an action brought pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), which is similar to an action brought
under section 12 of the Securities Act, a plaintiff is required to prove
more than mere negligence. Under section 18 of the Exchange Act,
accountants are not held civilly liable if they "acted in good faith
and had no knowledge that [the financial] statement[s] w[ere] false

or misleading."'5 8 This makes gross negligence the standard for liability under section 18 of the Exchange Act, which governs actions
for liability for misleading statements. The plaintiff must further
prove that his damages were caused by a false or misleading statement, and that such statement affected the purchase or sale price of
the security involved.' 59
In suits concerning the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in sales of securities under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the
for aiding
offered to
156.
Any

and abetting a § 12(2) violation where the accountant was not alleged to have sold,
sell, or solicited the sale of securities).
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (emphasis added) provides:
person who-

(2) offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact .. .and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him ....
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771; Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(regarding § 77k(a)).
158. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (emphasis
added), provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder ... which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, shall be liable to any person who in reliance upon such statement, shall have
purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement ...
unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading.
159. Id.; Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Exchange Act, the plaintiff must prove scienter.'6 0 Such a high standard is not easily proved by a plaintiff. Furthermore, these provisions
may not provide any relief for non-client plaintiffs at all. A cause of
action under section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 may not exist for third
persons not in privity with the defendant auditor. 1 6' Also, the Supreme Court has recently decided that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
do not give a private plaintiff a right of action against an auditor for
aiding and abetting a manipulative or deceptive act.' 62
Therefore, it is obvious that, while it will be extremely difficult
for non-client plaintiff investors to recover the losses caused by a
negligent audit by using the federal securities laws (if they can recover at all), non-client plaintiffs that are able to use the Restate160. In action brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Rule l0b-5, the plaintiff
securities purchaser was required to prove that the defendant accounting firm, which prepared
financial statements for the issuer of securities, knew that its report was misleading; scienter
was construed by the court such that it could be reckless disregard for the truth. Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
modified on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating in a lOb-5 action against accountant that recklessness is the standard for Rule lOb-5 actions in the Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit, and that
" '[rieckless conduct may be defined as highly unreasonable [conduct], . . .[that is] an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it'"), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). But see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that, in actions under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
" 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"); cf
Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (In action under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), the court stated that "[tihe Second Circuit has held that [the] plaintiff must 'specifically plead those events' that 'give rise to a strong inference' that defendant had knowledge of
the alleged falsity.").
161. See CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 739 F. Supp. 158, 164-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (accountant that "did not have duty to report on actual sales or the reasonableness of management's sales assumptions" in engagement letter with the plaintiff investor
was not liable to such plaintiff under Rule lOb-5 or § 10(b) for failing to report cancellation
of large order affecting corporation's sales projections); Leoni v. Rogers, 719 F. Supp. 555, 565
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that "[i]f there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties,
then no duty to disclose exists, and one party's failure to supply another party with material
information is not actionable under sec[tion] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5"). But see Arthur Young
& Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1336 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the auditor of financial
statements may be liable for rescission damages to purchasers of securities with whom the
auditor was not in privity), affd, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993); Atlantis
Group, Inc. v. Rospatch Corp. (In re Rospatch Sec. Litig.), 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1250-52 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant auditor had a duty to disclose in order to hold the auditor liable in an action under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5).
162. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S.Ct. 1439,
1446, 1448 (1994) (stating that a "private plaintiff may not bring a lOb-5 suit against a
defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of [Exchange Act] § 10(b)"; aiding arid abetting
a manipulative or deceptive act is not prohibited by Exchange Act § 10(b)).
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ment rule-i.e. large institutional investors and creditors-will bear

much smaller burdens in proving their claims. This is so, even
though the losses of the two classes of plaintiffs are similar, the
losses were caused in the same manner by the same negligent acts,

and both classes of plaintiffs received the audit opinion and financial
statements for free. Moreover, creditors will not be able to avail
themselves of federal securities laws which only apply to the sale or

issuance of securities.
2. The Small
Unprotected

Investors and

Small

Creditors

Are Left

The Bily Court asserts that third-party plaintiffs are in a better
position to bear the risk associated with false or misleading audits.16 3
The rationale is two-fold. First, the auditor is in a worse position to
protect against losses because he is an outsider who gets his financial
information from the client."" Second, many third-parties are in a

position to protect their interest when dealing with the client. For
instance, a creditor may obtain a security interest in the assets of the
auditor's client, 1 5 require a guarantee of payment from the client, 166

or insure its interest. 6 7 The third-party can insist that any transaction resulting from reliance on the audited statement be assured
through the posting of a bond.' 6 8 Furthermore, a creditor can scruti163. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
164. Christopher B. Harmon, Recent Decision, Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert:
A Decision Accountants Should Applaud, 42 ALA. L. REV. 1419, 1427 (1991).
165. "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of
title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer . . . is
limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also includes any
interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9 [of the
Uniform Commercial Code] ....
Whether a transaction creates a ... security interest is determined by the facts of
each case ....
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990). For rules of law commonly governing security interests, see generally U.C.C. art. 9 (1990).
166. Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 305 (1988) (giving the example that in Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983), the plaintiff lending bank had some of
its loans to the auditor's client guaranteed by the Small Business Administration).
167. Gossman, supra note 25, at 229.
168. Goldberg, supra note 166, at 301 (the "bond would reimburse the lenders for all
losses suffered in the event that the borrower defaulted and an outside observer (a jury or
arbitrator) concluded that the accountant's audit was negligent"). Goldberg further observes
that this process is equivalent to a civil trial under the tort standard. Id.
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nize a credit application closely, 169 can require an applicant to undergo an audit whereby the creditor is specifically named as a thirdparty beneficiary, 17 0, and can take measures to protect against losses
through write-offs or insurance."' If the creditor must pay for the
independent audit, he may pass on the cost to the client in the form
of an increase in the cost of credit. This increase in the cost of credit
will, in turn, be passed on by the client to its customers in the form
of increased prices for its goods and services. 7 This is the exact
same result that occurs when the accountant passes the increased
cost of insurance on to the client.
It is also contended that, like creditors, investors also have the
ability to protect themselves. For instance, an investor may diversify
his range of investments.' 7 Additionally, it seems evident that creditors and investors can readily evaluate and alter their risks by the
amounts of their loans and investments.1 7' Thus, arguably, creditors
and investors are in a good position to protect themselves against the
risk of the insolvency of the auditor's client.
Nonetheless, the small' 7 5 investor and small creditor, who are
not protected by the Restatement rule, are left relatively insecure.
First, many investors are unsophisticated individuals that lack a significant capacity to bargain directly with the client and auditor over
investment risks. 176 For example, if a noninstitutional investor attempted to incorporate the cost associated with overstated financial
statements by offering a lower price for the security, the probable
result would be a failure to acquire the desired security. This result
is likely because of the enormous number of competing investors in
the marketplace that take the pricing decisions out of the control of
small investors. 77 Second, the small investor may lack the funds to
169. Gossman, supra note 25, at 239.
170. Id.; Siliciano, supra note 115, at 1956. This provides the creditor with privity to the
accountant it hires because the creditor would be a direct beneficiary of the contract. The
creditor would then fall under the Ultramares privity rule, if the auditor was negligent. See
Siliciano, supra note 115, at 1956 & n.139.
171. Gossman, supra note 25, at 239.
172. Siliciano, supra note 115, at 1972-73.
173. Id. at 1973.
174. Gossman, supra note 25, at 239; Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 593.
175. "Small" denoting small amounts of money invested-i.e: not an institutional investor or wealthy person. For example, the local business furniture and computer stores which sell
to a business on a credit basis would be small creditors.
176. Siliciano, supra note 115, at 1958.
177. See Hagen Ii, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 207. Whereas some
institutional investors, like Fidelity Investments, California Public Employee Retirement System, etc. can change the price of a security when they buy or sell large blocks of shares (often
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diversify his investments. 178 Third, the individual investor and small
creditor generally cannot afford the prohibitive cost of paying for
their own audit. It is much more efficient for the audit to be conducted once by the client's auditor, than it is to have every potential
creditor or investor conduct its own audit of the client-business.
Fourth, the small investor and small creditor have no real ability to
redistribute the loss widely across society, 179 as compared to such
ability possessed by an institutional investor, or large lending bank. It
is these small investors and small creditors that most need protection
when an auditor is negligent. However, the Bily decision leaves them
in the precarious position of bearing the loss themselves because of
the arbitrary limitations imposed by the Restatement approach.
Lastly, it is the client's auditor, and not the investor or creditor, who
is in the best position to protect against third-party injury by conducting the audit in a non-negligent manner.
C.

The Insurance Dilemma

In Bily, the California Supreme Court rejected the policy rationale that the risk should be borne'by accountants through insurance.18 The current crisis in insurance for accountants is largely the
reason for this decision by the court. As the liability of auditors has
increased, there has been an accompanying increase in the cost of
insurance to accountants. 8 1 This increase has had the effect of precluding all but the larger accounting firms from obtaining insurance
protection.'
As awards and settlements in cases of auditor negligence begin to exceed $300 million each,' 83 the number of accounting firms large enough to absorb such losses, even with insurance, is
minute at best.
hundreds of thousands, or millions at a time), the enormous volume and value of the client's
shares being publicly traded prohibits the small investor from impacting the price of the security through its decisions to buy or sell the security.
178. However, it has become much easier for an individual to diversify his equity investments in recent years because of the advent of mutual funds as investment vehicles.
179. Siliciano, supra note 115, at 1973.
180. 834 P.2d at 765.
181. Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 593 (stating that since 1985, the average insurance deductible for accountant malpractice insurance has doubled and the actual premiums
have skyrocketed as well).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Lee Berton & Stephen J. Adler, CPA's Nightmare: How Audit of a Bank
Cost Price Waterhouse $338 Million Judgment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1992, at Al, A4;
Susan Schmidt, Ernst & Young Pays $400 Million to Settle Thrift Regulators' Claims,
WASH, POST,

Nov. 24, 1992, at Al.
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While, in theory, small CPA firms may be financially squeezed
out of the audit business because of fee competition with the "Big
Six" firms and an uncertain malpractice insurance market, in reality, small CPA firms do not perform a large amount of audits and,
thus, do not need audit malpractice insurance."" The number of parties and transactions that rely on audits that are not mandated by
federal securities laws is very limited. 185 Most audits of publiclytraded companies are already performed by the largest CPA firms
with their great financial resources. 18 6 This means that most cases of
negligent auditing will involve the few largest firms. Common sense,
thus, indicates that the smaller CPA firms will not have to bear the
burden of greater insurance costs because they will not have to litigate, or pay damages in, auditor negligence actions.
Insurance does not work as well in reality as it does in theory.
Although it is theorized that negligent accounting firms will individually incur the additional malpractice premiums resulting from their
negligence,"' an inequitable distribution of the insurance costs will
result when courts handle accountant negligence as strict liability' 8 8-that is, if the courts, in most instances, do not hold the plaintiffs to their burdens of proof. Since courts frequently fail to make
plaintiffs prove their burdens of proof, the equitable allocation of the
increased costs of insurance has not been effective.
For insurance to operate effectively, the insurer must be able to
project the level of possible losses with reasonable certainty. 189 This
is straightforward under the privity rule and the Restatement rule,
where third-parties that are not in privity must guard against their
184. See John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third Party
Rights: Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability, 22 GA. L. REV. 149, 188
(1987).
185. See supra note 52 (discussing the requirement that companies with publicly traded
securities annually file certified financial statements with the SEC).
186. The "Big Six" [accounting firms] audit nearly 90% of all publicly traded
corporations with annual revenues of at least one million dollars. Moreover, the "Big
Six" audit nearly all of the country's largest corporations, including ... 494 of the
Fortune 500 industrials; 97 of the Fortune 100 fastest growing companies; 99 of the
Fortune 100 largest commercial banks; 92 of the top 100 defense contractors; and
195 of the 200 largest insurance companies."
Lewis P. Checchia, Note, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties Under Bily v. Arthur Young
& Company: Does a Watchdog Need Protection?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 249, 269 n.104 (1993)
(citation omitted).
187. Hagen 11, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 208.
188. Id. at 209.
189. Siliciano, supra note 115, at 1949.
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own losses.19 0 Under the foreseeability approach, the accountant and
his insurer lack knowledge about the identity, number and/or financial exposure of the third-parties whose losses they must insure
against.19 However, it is possible to estimate such losses under the
foreseeability approach by analyzing the clients' business practices,
debt structures, etc. 92
Additionally, accountants, if they choose, can limit their services by refusing to perform audits for risky clients. 93 This is, however, unnecessary because the demand for audits is inelastic; 94 federal securities law mandates that publicly traded corporations must
have annual independent audits. 95 This inelasticity of demand
means that risky clients cannot refuse the auditors' services, even if
auditors increase their fees to such clients (to cover the increased
cost of liability insurance caused by the extra risk in audits of such
clients). In this manner, even auditors with risky clients can remain
solvent and afford to maintain insurance to protect against negligent
audits because it is the client that will pay for the increased insurance premiums in the end. Generally, the client will then spread this
cost by increasing the price of its products or services. This is the
same result that occurs when the non-client creditor bears the costs
96
of the negligent audit.
If steps are taken to decrease the amount of damages being
paid, the insurance dilemma would probably no longer be a dilemma. If uniform national rules were established, and if courts held
plaintiffs responsible for bearing their burdens inherent in the trial
adversary system, instead of treating auditor negligence as strict liability, the problem of escalating insurance costs could probably be
resolved.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1949-50.
193. Id. at 1960.
194. Elasticity of demand is the ratio of percentage of change in quantity demanded for
a product to the associated percentage of change in the price of the product. Demand for a
product is inelastic if this ratio is less than one. That is, if the price of a product increases by
10% and the demand for the product does not decrease, or decreases by less than 10%, the
product is said to have inelastic demand. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER. ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 483-84 (4th ed. 1988).
195. Companies whose securities are traded on a national securities exchange, which
have assets of $1 million or more, and which have equity securities held by 500 or more persons must file with the SEC an annual report containing certified financial statements. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1988). This makes an audit a
necessity for most publicly traded companies. Goods that are necessities tend to have inelastic
demand. BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 194, at 490.
196. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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Accountants Can Protect Themselves

In deciding that the investors and creditors should bear the loss
for a negligent audit, the Bily Court failed to take account of the

many actions that auditors can take to limit their liability. Steps
may be taken by auditors to better order and limit their risks in case
they perform an audit negligently.
For example, during fee negotiations, the auditor may require
that clients identify all reasonably foreseeable users and recipients of
the financial statements in order to adequately estimate the potential
liability exposure. 197 In the audit opinion, the accountant can issue a
reasonably prudent disclaimer which, in clear and exact terms, indicates how a particular audited statement does not meet accounting
standards, and give the reasons for that inadequacy. 198 Qualifications
will not be effective if the matters disclaimed are within the auditor's
rightful range of examination, are worded too generally, are unclear,
or arrive too late to be meaningful for the end user.1 99 However,
when done adequately they can greatly decrease the auditor's risk of

being liable for negligence.
Consequently, there are actions that the accountants may take
to limit their potential liability to third-parties. Although the Bily
Court reasons that the third-party plaintiffs should bear the risk be197. Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 184, at 190.
198. Id. at 175; Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 597; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
199. Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 184, at 178. A qualification was ruled to be too
general where it stated that the audit opinion was "subject to realization." Id. (citing Herzfeld
v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1986)). The court
stated that an auditor had a duty to inquire into the specific facts giving rise to the qualification and provide a clear explanation of the reasons for such qualification. Herzfeld, 540 F.2d
at 36. An auditor whose letter qualifying the scope of examination, which arrived 30 days after
the financial statements were issued, was held liable for active misrepresentation, and gross
negligence for the delay. State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416, 420 (N.Y. 1938). Excessive generality and lack of clarity as to the scope of the qualification are also reasons for courts
to disregard such disclaimers. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz,
Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1972) (auditors were held liable
for negligence where they failed to disclaim in certified financial statements that leasehold
improvements did not exist, but they did disclaim that "overall ... they could not express an
opinion with regard to their fairness" and that the precise value of leasehold improvements
could not be determined); 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 277 N.Y.S.2d 996,
997 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 238 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1968) (summary judgment was
precluded where a client's financial statements stated "'[n]o independent verifications were
undertaken thereon' " but the annual report submitted to shareholders did not contain such
disclaimer).
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cause they are in a better position to avoid such
are at least as able to bear the risk as creditors
over, putting the burden on the accountants to
duct fosters the public policy of disseminating
truthful information.
E.

risk, the accountants
and investors. Moreavoid negligent cona greater amount of

The Deterrence Rationale

In Bily, the court disregarded the deterrence rationale of the
foreseeability approach, deeming it uncompelling when compared
with the ruinous liability the accounting profession faces.2"' Some
commentators claim that professionals already have incentives to do
their work carefully because of the duties that they owe to their clients, the economic value of having a good professional reputation, 0 1
the possibility of adverse publicity, the possible loss of clientele, and
the costs of litigation.20 2 These arguments are unpersuasive.
As explained throughout this Comment, it is not clear that accountants face ruinous liability at all.20 3 The accounting profession
may avoid ruinous liability, while maintaining the foreseeability approach, by taking some of the actions previously mentioned in this
Comment-e.g. using proper disclaimers and qualifications of audit
opinions,2" 4 using insurance,2 05 and developing and adhering to clear,
206
unambiguous, non-discretionary, uniform standards.
In its decision, the Bily Court should have taken into consideration anything that would encourage greater care by auditors in carrying out their professional responsibilities. In the context of auditor
liability, the deterrence rationale is more persuasive, and should have
been given greater weight by inclusion in the Bily Court's decision.
In practice, unless the auditor may be held liable to non-client thirdparties, nothing at all exists to deter the auditor from negligent conduct and the dissemination of untruthful information.
Here, some examples are enlightening. Suppose that there is a
client (C) that faces a strong possibility of insolvency. C had contracted with auditor (A) to conduct an audit for the year 1993. A
conducts the audit, but negligently overstates C's net earnings by
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Bily, 834 P.2d at 757.
E.g., Martin, supra note 63, at 665, 675.
Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 594.
See supra notes 112-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23, 198-99 and accompanying text.
See supra part III.C.
See supra part I.A.; supra notes 112-39 and accompanying text.
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$20 million, and overstates C's net worth by $20 million. C lost $10
million and is actually insolvent with debts to various creditors totalling $15 million. Unsecured creditor (U), relying on the financial
statements audited by A, extends credit to C in the amount of
$200,000. A knows about C's transaction with U, but A is not specifically conducting the audit for this particular transaction. A lacks
knowledge of the fact that C has supplied U with a copy of the financial statements specifically to assure U of C's financial solvency.
Subsequently, C declares bankruptcy and none of the unsecured
creditors, such as U, receive what they are owed. Only C may sue A
for negligence in the conduct of the audit. However, C would not sue
A because A overstated C's earnings and net worth, and C thereby
benefitted from A's negligence. Under the Restatement rule, A is not
liable to U because A did not specifically know that C intended U to
rely on the audited financial statements in the particular transaction
between C and U. A gets to enjoy its fees for the audit even though
it was conducted negligently, but U suffers a $200,000 loss even
though both C and A know that businesses have their financial statements audited so that they may attract investors and/or creditors
such as U. Clearly, under the Restatement rule there is nothing to
deter negligence by an auditor, especially when the negligence results in an overstatement of the client's net worth or net earnings.
Likewise, the Restatement rule allows the auditor to engage in
selective knowledge. To avoid liability, the auditor may merely request that the client not inform him of any transactions in which the
client intends to use the audited financial statements.107 Thus, if the
auditor is not informed, as he has requested, he will lack the intent
to influence any transaction, and lack knowledge "that the [client] so

intends [to influence any transaction]

.1208

Therefore, the auditor can

avoid any liability for negligent conduct which benefits the client.
Under the rule of the Restatement, there is no deterrence
against negligent conduct. The Restatement rule allows auditors to
engage in negligent conduct with no concomitant liability for losses
suffered by non-clients because of such negligence. Additionally, auditors will not suffer a loss of reputation, receive adverse publicity, or
lose clientele 0 9 because the audited businesses, which are the auditor's clientele, will not be harmed under the above circumstances-in
fact, the clients will benefit because the misstatement will make it
207.
208.
209.

See Boveri & Marshall, supra note 137, at 287.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(b) (1978).
See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
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more likely that investors and creditors will invest or extend credit to
them. The costs of litigation 210 will not be great because very few, if
any, non-clients will sue as the Restatement rule absolutely precludes their recovery.
F. Fundamental Fairness
The final criteria that must be examined is the fundamental
fairness of each approach used in auditor liability cases. An accountant does not guarantee perfection, he only indicates that any errors
subsequently discovered could not have been detected by an audit
conducted pursuant to GAAS or GAAP.2 11 The accountant can discover mistakes, irregularities and fraud through an audit, but the
2 12
third-party usually only has limited access to corporate records.
Consequently, equity mandates that the risk of loss be shifted from a
blameless, innocent party that usually is unable to protect itself from
a negligent audit, to the negligent accountant. 3 This is especially
true in light of the increasing complexity of financial transactions,
which causes the public to rely on the work of accountants more now
than ever before.21 4 The foreseeability approach seeks to have the
innocent injured party compensated by a negligent party, and to deter socially unreasonable conduct.2 15 The Restatement states:
"[where] there is no intent to deceive but only good faith coupled
with negligence, the fault of the maker of the misrepresentation is
sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for its consequences. ' ' 216 This promotes "the important social policy of encouraging the flow of commercial information upon which the operation of
210. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
211. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr.
218, 224-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745
(Cal. 1992).
212. Hagen 11, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 207; Kirby & Davies, supra
note 39, at 595.
213. If it is unfair for a defendant to incur a loss for injuries which could not have
been foreseen, it is no less fair for the plaintiff to incur a loss which did not result
from his own negligence, but rather, that of the defendant.... Thus, as between an
innocent third party and a negligent accountant, the latter should be the party who
bears the loss resulting from professional malpractice.
Hagen 11, Common Law Negligence. supra note 51, at 207.
214. Diab, supra note 126, at 1459; see Gossman, supra note 25, at 232.
215. Francis Achampong, Common Law Liability of Accountants for Negligence to
Non-Contractual Parties: Recent Developments, 91 DICK. L. REV. 677, 694 (1987); Howard
B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 250, 256 (1983).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 com. a (1978).
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the economy rests." 2" However, since the securities laws require
that most companies whose securities are publicly traded file certified financial statements annually,2 18 it is unnecessary to encourage
the flow of such information through the adoption of the Restatement rule.2" 9 If it is unfair for a defendant to incur a loss for injuries
that could not have been foreseen, as the Bily Court asserts, it is just
as unfair for a plaintiff to incur a loss that did not result from his
own negligence, but rather, from the negligence of the defendantauditor. Thus, between an innocent non-client plaintiff and the accountant that performed a negligent audit, the accountant should be
the party that bears the loss resulting from the negligence. The foreseeability approach incorporates this premise and imposes a duty of
care upon each person to refrain from negligent conduct towards
others.
Another issue of fairness that arises in the context of auditor
liability is the use of selective knowledge by the auditor. For the
accountant to be liable to non-client plaintiffs, the Restatement approach requires the accountant to have knowledge of the client's uses
for the audited financial statements.2 0 This can become complex, as
the accountant can have various degrees of knowledge of the client's
stated intentions for the audit.2 2 In this way the Restatement disregards fairness because a clever accountant can avoid liability under
the Restatement by asking his client not to reveal to him the intended users of the financial statements, even though the auditor
knows that the client will use the audited financial statements to
raise capital from investors and creditors.2 22 Hence, whereas the
foreseeability rule is based upon fundamental fairness by allowing all
damaged plaintiffs a right to recovery, the Restatement approach allows for very arbitrary and inequitable results.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Restatement approach, as adopted by Bily, is essentially a
return to the doctrine of privity in cases of auditor negligence. In
deciding the complicated matter of auditor liability to third-parties,
courts throughout the nation must balance the possibility of burden217. Id.
218. See supra notes 186, 195 and accompanying text.
219. Hagen II, Common Law Negligence, supra note 51, at 200.
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
221. Kirby & Davies, supra note 39, at 592.
222. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
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ing auditors with purported ruinous liability against the unjustness
of allowing innocent victims to go uncompensated. While the foreseeability approach may seem fairer to investors and creditors, it can
be used to achieve fairness for all parties involved in an auditor negligence suit. If the courts frequently and strictly enforce the burdens
of proof that plaintiffs must sustain in order to win a case (i.e. that
the plaintiff relied on the audit report, that the reliance on the audit
report was the proximate cause of injury, etc.), there would be fewer
losses by accountants and fewer damages to be paid. For example, if
the plaintiff invested in or lent to the client business because of factors other than the audit, the amount of damages or the liability of
the defendant accountant should be adjusted accordingly. This
would preclude or limit recovery in cases in which the plaintiff is a
bank, creditor, or other financial institution which has a great
amount of business sophistication and access to information. It is
highly unlikely that such entities rely solely on audit reports when
extending credit to businesses. However, as the foreseeability approach is being applied by some courts, accountants are strictly liable for negligence.
Moreover, GAAP and GAAS should not be used as a standard
of liability for auditor negligence because they are wholly inadequate. Perhaps, the Bily Court did not realize that it was adopting
GAAP and GAAS as the liability standard when it ruled that nonclients can sue auditors only for negligent misrepresentation. Nonetheless, uniform, non-discretionary standards are needed, rather than
ambiguous rules that accountants themselves have created. Uniform
non-discretionary standards would remove much of the guess-work
from accountant negligence litigation. Congress should adopt uniform national standards governing the conduct of an audit. Such legislation would improve the usefulness and reliability of financial
information.
The Restatement rule and the privity approach as remedies to
the problem of auditor negligence are too strict. Creditors and investors have a clear and undeniable right to compensation for losses
that result from reliance upon a negligent audit. This right must be
protected, especially in the case of individual investors and small
creditors, who are less likely than large institutional investors or
creditors to receive compensation under the Restatement rule, privity
doctrine, or federal securities laws. Unlike the Restatement approach, the foreseeability rule does not arbitrarily deny the right to
compensation. Although the adversary system may not work per-
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fectly, there is no justification for a court to disregard it or dispose of
it, as the California Supreme Court has done in Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co.
William A. Sinacori

